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In a witty reworking of a classic aphorism, Winnie Holzman and Stephen Schwartz’s
2003 Broadway smash-hit Wicked: The Untold Stories of the Witches of Oz opens with Glinda,
the Good Witch, posing a question which the rest of the show will answer: “Are people born
Wicked, or do they have Wickedness thrust upon them” (Chenoweth, “No One Mourns the
Wicked”)? This philosophical exploration into what makes people wicked, and by association
the essence of human nature, is not singular to the musical Wicked or other popular literature.
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacque Rousseau, in his own investigation into this question in
his Discourse on the Inequality Among Men, radically argues that a) humans aren’t violent by
nature and b) humans aren’t social by nature. To Rousseau, it is society itself that twists human
nature from empathetic and benevolent to malicious and power-hungry, starting from the family
and working out to all levels of society. Two very popular texts in our society today, Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein and the aforementioned Wicked, explore Rousseau’s theory.
Frankenstein’s Monster is in a more direct agreement with Rousseau, personifying the transition
from benevolence to corruption via the desire for family and community. Elphaba, on the other
hand, problematizes Rousseau’s theory by proving that empathy between individuals can prevent
individual corruption and work to correct the ills of society.
Since Rousseau, as a well-known to the Romantics1 Enlightenment philosopher, directly
influenced the creation of Frankenstein, his Second Discourse on the Inequalities Among Men

1

The Romantic period in literature, or Romanticism, is roughly timed from the 1790s, around the
French Revolution, to the mid-1800s. Romantic authors range from Mary Shelley’s parents,
William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, to William Blake, Lord Byron, and Samuel
Coleridge. Simply defined, this literary movement, in part, was a creative reaction to much the
philosophy and learning espoused during the Enlightenment of the 1700s, a switch from a heavy
emphasis on the purely rational back to the natural and imaginative. Several elements key in
Romanticism are an emphasis on originality (as opposed to emulation, parody, or plagiarism),
subverting the status quo (such as questioning institutions like the government and church), and
the power of nature to inspire and calm one’s spirit.
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needs to be understood. This discourse operates in three parts: how man would be in a true state
of nature, how that state of nature evolved into civil society, and why there are so many ills in
society. There are two types of “man” in his discourse: man in the state of nature, know as the
Savage Man, and man in society, know as the Social Man.2 Rousseau asks the reader to suspend
disbelief as he paints a picture of man more than a few millennia ago: solitary, satisfied, selfsufficient, and apparently savage. His argument is that the transition of this Savage Man, and
humanity, into the Social Man, and civilization, drastically alters man, as the ability to empathize
is buried under socially constructed desires for socially constructed ideas such as power, fame,
and reputation. This, for Rousseau, is the true cause of all social ills, and even some of the
physical ills, humanity currently faces. Rousseau, as critic Timothy O’Hagan argues, is directly
opposing “at least two received doctrines concerning essential human characteristics, the
Aristotelian assumption of natural sociability and Hobbesian assumption of natural aggression,”
(O’Hagan, 37). Combined, this sociability and belligerence innately posits wickedness in human
nature, and society is needed to regulate that wickedness. Rousseau claims the opposite: that man
is innately good, and it is society that teaches man to be violent, and therefore wickedness is a
learned trait. For Rousseau, the creation of family units is the bedrock for wickedness and
inequality, aggregating these lessons as family units grew into larger communities. At one point
Rousseau emphasizes this divergence between the Savage and Social Man, remarking, “nothing
could be more unhappy than the Savage Man, dazzled by science, tormented by his passions, and
reasoning about a state different from his own” (Rousseau, 18).

2

Though termed the Savage and Social Man, “Man” here does not mean male so much as
humanity in general. In this essay, the titles of Savage Man, Social Man, and Savage-Social Man
will continue to use “Man” in reference to all humanity, not just half.
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Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein picks up this idea that family and society corrupt
benevolence, as the main tension of the novel is the unfulfilled parental obligations Victor owes
his creation and the ways the Monster delves into moral depravity to obtain, or avenge himself
of, these obligations. The Monster, then, can be and has been seen as a representation of the
transition from Savage to Social Man, because of the subsequent corruption of his soul. Both the
Monster’s experiences and Rousseau essentially argued that the Savage Man in all respects is
better off than the Social Man. The first reason for this, as described by O’Hagan, is because the
hypothetical forest the Savage Man lives in “is a circular, self-producing state in which all needs
are satisfied,” meaning the basic necessities of food, water, and shelter, the only things the
Savage Man would want, are perpetually plentiful (O’Hagan, 40). In this forest, then, the Savage
Man is at his physical peak, because “he must exercise most those faculties which are most
concerned with attack or defense, either for overcoming his prey, or for preventing him from
becoming the prey of other animals” (Rousseau, 13). This includes not just physical strength and
endurance, but basic resourcefulness and cleverness to outwit his predator and survive in nature.
The Savage Man, for Rousseau, has no need to learn more than basic survival skills. This is how
the Monster begins after his creation and abandonment by Victor, wandering “the forest near
Ingolstadt,” eating berries, “attempting to imitate the pleasant songs of the birds,” and eventually
distinguishing “the insect from the herb, and by degrees, one herb from another” (Shelley, 70,
71). Throughout the Monster’s narrative, a constant theme is his ability to observe and utilize his
surroundings to his advantage, as the Savage Man does.
The second reason the Savage Man is better off is because he exists in total social
isolation. In this state, the Savage Man has compassion for other humans, the more the Savage
Man “identifies himself with the animal that suffers…which, by moderating the violence of love
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of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the whole species. It is this
compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress”
(Rousseau, 20). This means that the Savage Man is most likely to help another being, human or
animal, because of an ability to empathize with that creature without heavily considering cost to
himself. The Monster clearly exhibits this benevolence and empathy in regards to the de Lacey
family, while his presence is still unknown to them. When he realizes they are starving in winter,
he ceases to steal their food so as not cause them further hardships. In addition, he “often took
[Felix de Lacey’s] tools, the use of which [the Monster] quickly discovered, and brought home
firing sufficient for the consumption of several days,” helping the family with their daily chores
(Shelley, 77). The Monster empathizes with the family’s suffering – only later would he
understand it as poverty – in winter, and continues to do so in the spring, though he still hadn’t
established a formal relationship with any member of the family, and so was still isolated.
Rousseau further makes a point to emphasize that the Savage Man is an independent
being – sans language, sans community, sans government. Therefore, he would not know of, nor
naturally desire, things such as language, community, or authority. Through the formation of
society, the Savage Man is taught to desire these things, which underlies his transition into the
Social Man. As the outsider, the Monster literally looks into the cottage of the de Lacey’s and
learns about all of these, starting with familial community, moving to recognizing that ultimate
authority rested with the father de Lacey, and advancing to language. The words he picks up
fastest are practical, “fire, milk, bread, and wood,” but the abstract concepts, “good, dearest,
unhappy” he stumbles on until he secretly learns French alongside foreigner and newest de
Lacey, Safie (Shelley, 77). However, this education isn’t as joyful as it could have been;
Rousseau argues that the Savage Man would “know neither hatred nor the desire for revenge,”
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nor “a sense of injury,” if not for society because he’d have no way to compare his state to
another’s in order to feel these emotions (Rousseau, 41). With his education, the Monster can do
just that, comparing himself to the family, and quickly begins to despise his otherness:
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers – their grace, beauty, and delicate
complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent
pool!... when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am,
I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. Alas! I
did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity. (Shelley,
79)
He learned with Volney’s Ruins of Empires that the epitome of society was to have “high and
unsullied descent united with riches,” and began to realize that his appearance isn’t the only
barrier to society he must battle (Shelley, 82, 83). In questioning, “where were my friends and
relations,” the Monster develops the “desire to claim [the de Lacey’s] protection and kindness;
my heart yearned to be known and loved by these amiable creatures: to see their sweet looks
turned towards me with affection, was the utmost limit of my ambition” (Shelley, 84, 92). When
the Monster finally pleads his case to blind Father de Lacey, who sympathizes with him, his plan
fails as Felix, with one look thinking the Monster a threat to his father, threw the Monster from
his father and struck him, not giving the Monster a chance to speak or defend himself. The
Monster fled the cottage with feelings of “rage and revenge… from that moment I declared
evertlasting war against the species, and, more than all, against him who had formed me, and
sent me forth to this insupportable misery” (Shelley, 95). Thus, the Monster turns his wrath and
frustration on Victor, for thoughtlessly creating and abandoning him instead of showing the love
and support to him that Father de Lacey showed to his children.
In Shelley’s novel, society is a double-edged sword. Its great irony, and its stark
difference from the pure state of nature, is that it teaches man the “violence of love of self”
which allows humans to act in wickedness through teaching them to desire relationships with
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others, especially ones where they are in power (Rousseau, 20). Society allows men to divide
labor, which permits specialization in occupations and leisure for artistic creation, leading to “the
natural inequality of mankind” by increasing “the inequalities of social institutions” (Rousseau,
22); some occupations are deemed more noble and desirable than others, and thus a hierarchy is
born in community. To summarize Rousseau, though the stringent adherence to a perpetuated,
social hierarchy takes centuries to form, the point being made is that the formation of society,
from the family out, delineates relationships between humans where one is inferior to another,
either because of some dependence or through a lack of physical and/or intellectual training.
These differences are then augmented by assumptions of how these unequal relationships should
play out; these assumptions eventually become law, which influences the punishments dealt to
those who are seen as acting in violation. The Monster learns this through his education at the de
Lacey’s and utilizes it to frame Justine, the Frankenstein family’s adopted cousin, for the murder
of the youngest Frankenstein, William, the boy she was suppose to care for, as part of his
revenge against Victor. For Rousseau, “the bonds of servitude” created by “the mutual
dependence of men on one another and the reciprocal needs that unite them” in society cement a
series of slave-master dynamics from family to work, such as Justine’s with the Frankenstein
family (Rousseau, 23). This slave-master dynamic act as another source for the learned
wickedness of the Social Man, since, as a slave, he resents his dependence upon and perceived
inferiority to another; or, as the master, he resents the potential of the slave to revolt and switch
their roles. The Monster understood this when framing Justine, knowing that her perceived
retaliation to her masters, the Frankensteins, would be enough of a scare to others to warrant her
death. This dynamic begins with parent-child relations in families and is extrapolated throughout
the larger society as minorities resent the rule of the majorities who in turn fear being subjected
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to domination themselves. In the state of nature, however, “every one is there his own master”
because each man only needs himself to survive (Rousseau, 23). In summary, for Rousseau,
isolation is freedom; society is bondage, emotional baggage, and power-dynamic violence.
Because the Monster transitioned from a state of nature to society, Shelley can work him
into these slave-master relations in the dynamic of parent-child relations. The Monster’s first
plea calls upon Victor to fulfill his neglected fatherly duties to the Monster by ensuring him a
society that accepts him, by making him a bride like himself. The Monster reasons that a creature
just as hideous as him will accept him, since they’d both be rejected by human society; the
Monster promises that they will retreat to a remote recess of the world together, never to bother
humanity again. Victor acquiesces for fear that his child-creation will murder anymore of his
family members. However, this time he actually contemplates what this female creation might
think about being created, being forced to marry another being, and being rejected by a society
she’d probably deem superior to herself. He comes to the conclusion that she would be a menace
both as a second monster and as the possible mother of a new and violent species; for the sake of
humanity, Victor destroys her before completion. Recognizing that his only true dependence on
Victor was for a female, that he deserves justice for yet again being denied the parental care
owed to him by Victor, and that the stark physical difference between himself and Victor allows
the Monster to terrorize Victor physically and psychologically (by destroying the people around
him) with impunity, the Monster proclaims: “You are my creator, but I am your master; - obey”
(Shelley, 120). This again reflects Rousseau’s belief that to “see a still more unequal contest, set
[the Savage and Social Man] together naked and unarmed, and you will soon see the advantage
of having all our forces constantly at our disposal” (Rousseau, 11). In his transition from Savage
to Social Man the Monster consciously commits sins such as acts of revenge, including murder
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and psychological torture, having learned that though absent in a state of nature, they are
sometimes justifiable in a state of society.
Thus the Monster embodies the downfall of society as he shows that coveting society
twists human benevolence to deceit, theft, scapegoating, murder, and much worse, in the pursuit
of social constructs such as property, inheritance, family, romantic love, beauty, fame, power,
wealth, and acceptance. As Zoe Beenstock notes, in this the Monster perfectly embodies the
transition of the Savage Man to the Social Man: “the creature responds to Victor’s rejection by
gradually changing from innocence to corrupt civilization, following the trajectory of human
history from an individualistic state of nature to social being” (Beenstock, 407). In becoming a
Social Man, the Monster can use the same teachings of society as justifications for his murderous
deeds. As he and Walton look upon the corpse of Victor, the Monster justifies himself,
lamenting, “I did not satisfy my own desires. They were forever ardent and craving; still I
desired love and fellowship, and I was still spurned. Was there no justice in this” (Shelley, 106)?
He continues saying, “the fallen angel becomes a malignant devil. Yet even that enemy of God
and man had friends and associates in his desolation; I am quite alone” (Shelley, 106).3 Though
isolation is a key part of the Savage Man, the Monster has already become the Social Man by
this point, and therefore needs society to create an identity for himself; this lack of acceptance by
society, for the Monster, only indicates the injuries he’s received by the society he still desires to
join. The Monster, even till the bitter end, believes that he was at least partly justified in his
vigilante vengeance because of the constant way he was treated by strangers and the abuse
Victor heaped on him. He does, however, recognize that “I am a wretch. I have murdered the
3

This is in reference to Satan from Milton’s Paradise Lost, one of the three books the Monster
found when he was with the de Laceys. He is arguing here that even Satan himself had
companions, the other fallen angels, in hell. The Monster is asking, then, if the devil himself can
have friends, why can’t he?
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lovely and the helpless; I have strangled the innocent as they slept and grasped to death his throat
who never injured me or any other living things” (Shelley, 106). As Edwards describes, the
Monster personifies what it means to have wickedness in its traditional sense – evil: “Evil does
not ask for forgiveness. Evil takes and destroys without any pause for consequence to others.
Evil divides and conquers, creating division not unity” (Edwards, 47). He accepts the title of
dæmon, wretch, and villain, because he was fully cognizant of the immoral actions he was
committing. In a word, he embodies and accepted his wickedness.
In a similar vein, Elphaba accepts the title “Wicked Witch of the West,” as audiences
assume, yet, unlike the Monster, she never truly embodies that title. She engages in the dialogue
between Rousseau and the Monster through her social rejection based on her appearance, a
conflict that also serves to depict the corrupt society around her and its tools for wider
oppression. Yet she challenges the narrative by defying the gravity of corruption. Though she
accepts the title of “Wicked” she never acts in wickedness, proving that there are solutions to
society’s ills. This twist to the witch’s character engages the audience to expand their empathy
and understanding of truth to learn from Elphaba’s point of view and apply it to their own lives.
The musical Wicked, based on the novel of the same name by Gregory Maguire, delves
into the world of Oz.4 Told through the memories of Glinda after the Wicked Witch’s demise,
the musical is a heart-wrenching whirlwind of political intrigue, social unrest, and moral
ambiguity with upbeat music and stunning visuals. Where the Witch is deliciously evil in the
1939 film, here, the named Witch is a young woman wanting to make a positive difference in the
world and hoping her altruism will eventually lead to social acceptance, just as with the

4

Maguire’s novel delves into the world of L. Frank Barnum’s novel The Wonderful Wizard of
Oz. The musical, on the other hand, interacts more with the 1939 movie; therefore, I will refer to
the movie for comparison more so than the novels.
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Monster.5 Already the fact that in this version she has more than just the title of Witch indicates
that she is someone to be empathized with. She isn’t a witch; she is Elphaba, who happens to be
a witch because of incredible magical powers and training. Yet, like the Monster, her appearance
is the barrier that separates her from her society. And like the Monster, most of her psychological
damage stems from her father-figures and broken family, leading her to accept the title of wicked
that others place upon her.
In quite a literal way, Elphaba and the Monster start out as creatures assembled from very
different parts, and the physicality of this drives their ostracization. Through some deductive
reasoning, and a plot twist clarified at the end of the show, Elphaba is revealed as a child of two
worlds: the Wizard’s (what is suppose to be our world) and Oz (via her mother). When
conceived, the Wizard gave her mother a mysterious “green elixir” which is the origin of her
green skin (Grey, “No One Mourns the Wicked”). Thus, her appearance denotes this
combination of should-be impossible parts. Furthermore, being a child of two worlds is also the
source of her incredibly powerful magic, like none other in Oz. The show highlights both the
power and the inability to control it that Elphaba must deal with because of this. Both her skin

5

The author would like it to be noted that at no point in the novel does the Monster ever gain a
name, either by himself or by Victor. He is just referred to as a monster or a wretch, both of
which add to this “otherness” and dehumanization. This also parallels the Wicked Witch of the
West in the movie and original L. Frank Baum novel. It wasn’t until Gregory Maguire’s novel
Wicked that she was named Elphaba. The psychological effects of leaving an “other” unnamed is
explored in other papers, but it should be reminded that being nameless limits the ability to
empathize with the character, in that they don’t have a true identity by which they call
themselves, just a title that others use. In giving Elphaba a name, she becomes a relatable
character because her name isn’t as heavily, negatively connoted as the titles of “Witch” or
“Wicked” are. However, even the musical emphasizes the importance of a group to dehumanize
their common enemy by denying that enemy a name, as in the song “March of the Witch
Hunters,” where Boq, now the Tin Man, cannot call her Elphaba: “And this is more than just a
service to the Wizard. / I have a personal score to settle with Elph- / with The Witch! / It's due to
her I'm made of tin / Her spell made this occur / So for once I'm glad I'm heartless / I'll be
heartless killing her!”
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and her magic repulse the man who believes he is her father, as he quickly states after her birth,
“take it away [emphasis mine]” (Mcourt, “No No One Mourns the Wicked”). This begins the
constant “othering” that Elphaba suffers throughout the show, which isolates her from the society
she wishes to inhabit, often leaving her to her own defenses. It is also this incredible power that
first draws her actual father, the Wizard, to her – when he believes she could be his ally; when
she turns on his political agenda, it is this same power he uses against her to demonize her and
turn her into Oz’s greatest criminal. In a similar vein, Frankenstein compiled his Monster from
dissonant parts. He admits that “the dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of
my materials,” detailing that this creature is made of both human and animal parts (Shelley, 34).
Victor had specifically chosen these parts to make the monster “beautiful,” yet upon
birth/animation he was filled with nothing but “breathless horror and disgust” (Shelley, 35, 36).
Both the father figures in these tales create life without considering the consequences of their
self-serving actions. The Wizard acts out of lust, Victor out of pride. Their children are the ones
who suffer for their selfish deeds, as Elphaba and the Monster, throughout their stories, must
constantly suffer calumny and consternation for appearances. In response, the Monster relatively
quickly gives up trying to win humanity’s favor by doing good deeds, instead matching the
wickedness he suffered through revenge. Elphaba, on the other hand, never lashes out in revenge
and, for the majority of the show, continues to commit altruistic deeds for those she believes
have been wronged, the Animals.6 In Frankenstein, the Monster is the only character suffering

6

The Animals are those animals in Oz who are anthropomorphic, or more human than beast. In
Maguire’s novel they are designated with a capital “A” to differentiate them from the plain
animals of Oz, noted with a lower case “a.” For Elphaba this issue is encapsulated by her goatteacher at Shiz, Dr. Dillamond, who befriended and defended Elphaba. In the show, he tells her
how other Animals in Oz are being persecuted as unable to continue their various occupations
and reverting to their primal natures. Elphaba promises him she will enlist the aid of the Wizard
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from persecution based on physicality; in Wicked, both Elphaba and the Animals are persecuted
because their physical differences are seen as sub-citizen. It is Elphaba’s ability to empathize
with the Animals that pushes her to fight for their rights, in turn influencing other characters to
recognize the problem with marginalizing an entire group of Ozians. Elphaba, as a character,
both demands and creates empathy as a way to combat ignorance, ostracization, and violence.
This completely counters the Monster, whose transition from benevolent to corrupt is mirrored
by his switch from inspiring sympathy to inciting revolt. Because he acts in wickedness, the most
he can achieve is objective sympathy; murder is still murder, and in committing his revenge
crimes the Monster destroys his own ability to win the empathy of others, isolating himself from
the ones he wants to join.
At this point, it’s important to return to the main objectives of both characters. In the
beginning of Act One, Elphaba’s goal is assimilation into society:
Once I'm with the wizard
My whole life will change,
'Cause once you're with the wizard
No one thinks you're strange!
No father is not proud of you,
No sister acts ashamed,
And all of Oz has to love you.
When by the wizard, you're acclaimed! (Menzel, “The Wizard and I”)
Elphaba continues, dreaming that because of her inner goodness the Wizard will somehow “deGreenify” her, enabling complete physical and social integration, both within the larger society
and within her own family (Menzel, “The Wizard and I”). This changes by the end of Act One,
however, as her desire for society is altered. Upon realizing the Wizard is the major cause of the
social ills in Oz, Elphaba decides that her public acceptance is less important than the rejection

to stop this. Dr. Dillamond is later fired, before Elphaba goes to the Emerald City, and
disappears.
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of the Animals. She rejects the Wizard and the society he’s building, telling Glinda that she’s
“through with playing by / The rules of someone else's game” (Menzel, “Defying Gravity”).
When Glinda urges her to stay and conform, a decision that will grant Elphaba social acceptance
and popularity, Elphaba argues in favor of isolation for a just cause, saying, “Everyone deserves
the chance to fly / And if I'm flying solo / At least I'm flying free” (Menzel, “Defying Gravity”).
Her chosen separation depicts the fatal flaw of society: “because individuality is fundamentally
asocial, socialization must rely on coercion to achieve conformity” (Beenstock, 412). In rejecting
coercion, she is able to create her own identity outside of society, based on her own morals and
her desire to help others. This ability to accept isolation with faith in her own decisions stands in
stark contrast to the Monster, who was never able to achieve such a self-validating mindset.
Though Elphaba never gains society, she does gain acceptance from three individuals,
something the Monster does not achieve. These individual relationships stand separate from each
other, and therefore do not constitute a society. As noted above, Elphaba has the acceptance of
Dr. Dillamond, another social outcast, who arguably acts as a third father-figure for her.7 She has
a friendship with Glinda, which will be explored later on. Her third relationship fulfills the
romantic love relationship that society teaches is one of the highest a person can achieve. She
falls in love with a man named Fiyero, who at first is infatuated with Glinda because she’s
“perfect” (Fitzgerald, “Dancing Through Life”). However, after coming to understand Elphaba,
Fiyero falls for the green witch in the First Act, running away with her in the Second. His love
validates her and her actions, as he falls for her altruism and passion for helping others; in turn,
he is changed as his vapid, carefree personality shifts to be caring and desirous to do the right
thing, loving Elphaba though she isn’t “perfect.” When he is imprisoned and tortured for

7

And the only good, if brief, one.
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knowledge on her whereabouts, Elphaba is thrown into an existential crisis. At this point in the
Second Act, Elphaba contemplates the failures of her life, recognizing both that she will never
achieve the society she desires and that any good deed she attempted ended worse for everyone
involved, commenting, “No good deed goes unpunished” (Menzel, “No Good Deed”). In this
song she mentions two others, aside from Fiyero, whom she believes she has failed: Dr.
Dillamond and her half-sister Nessa.8 Her failure to effect positive social change for the Animals
is represented in the de-evolution of Dr. Dillamond, from an Animal professor to an animal goat.
Nessa, however, is a failure for multiple reasons. The novel explains this more than the show, but
Elphaba’s family despises her because her non-biological father and sister blame her for Nessa’s
handicap, from birth, because her non-biological father gave several potions to her mother to
prevent a second child being green. Elphaba internalizes this blame, and this guilt is partly the
reason for her intense protective instinct for her younger sister. The other half of her
protectiveness comes from an honest place of sibling love, though it is evident that Nessa does
not reciprocate this feeling, resenting Elphaba for her own physical abnormalities and the
marginalization it causes. In an attempt to correct this, Elphaba gives Nessa the iconic ruby
slippers, enchanted to allow her to walk. This delights Nessa, until the munchkin she loves, Boq,
tells her he feels he can finally leave her service; this pushes Nessa to try to cast a spell on Boq
for his heart, which Elphaba quickly amends to save his life, turning him into the Tin Man.
Elphaba flees, and Nessa blames Elphaba for the transformation, scapegoating her once again
and adding to the hatred the Ozians already have for her. Furthermore, because of the shoes
Nessa can travel more, providing the opportunity for her death by house. Thus Elphaba’s act of
reconciliation causes the death of her sister, and so she blames herself for her inability to even
8

This is in reverse order of the song, where she starts with Nessa and ends with Fiyero, to
signify her mounting failures: familial, social, and personal.
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help her own kin. These three failures compound, and Elphaba cannot help but accept Oz’s
hatred: “So be it, then:/ Let all Oz be agreed/ I'm wicked through and through… No good deed
will I do again [emphasis mine]” (Menzel, “No Good Deed”)!
The Monster, unlike Elphaba, does not have a sibling, does not have a mentor or positive
father-figure, and does not have a romantic interest. One thing they do share, though, is an
existential crisis. His comes after saving a young girl from drowning and is shot, realizing that
his acts of kindness are wasted: “This was then the reward of my benevolence! I had saved a
human being from destruction, and, as a recompense, I now writhed under the miserable pain of
a wound, which shattered this flesh and bone. The feelings of kindness and gentleness, which I
had entertained but a few moments before, gave place to hellish rage” (Shelley, 99). These are
the key moments when each character acts as the Social Man, identifying themselves through
other’s perceptions of them, accepting the cruelty of the world they live in by internalizing and
taking as negative their otherness. The Monster accepts that no human will ever show him the
benevolence he is more than willing to share, and therefore decides, “if I cannot inspire love, I
will cause fear” (Shelley, 102). Elphaba comes to realize that both her social and personal goals
are fruitless, regardless of how altruistically intended they were, and finally accepts the title of
“Wicked” (Menzel, “No Good Deed”).
Yet even at these moments they are not equivalent. The Monster goes through the entire
tale of Frankenstein alone, which is the largest divergence between the two characters. Elphaba
eventually realizes she has had one constant source of validation and support, regardless of
whether they walked the same path: Glinda. From the beginning of the show, “they begin to
understand each other’s differences, and eventually develop acceptance and appreciation of their
unique qualities,” which leads to a relationship of support and encouragement from both ends,
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even when they disagree (Lane, 5). Glinda, though never joining Elphaba in her actions, always
ultimately accepts Elphaba for who she is and what she wants to do, as Elphaba does in turn. The
love triangle between Fiyero and the witches never shakes their friendship with jealousy or
bitterness. Elphaba accepts that she could never gain Fiyero’s love and still holds Glinda dear,
just as later on Glinda accepts that Fiyero loves Elphaba and that she still cares for Elphaba.
Their friendship is stronger than any of these moments of difference and discord. In “Defying
Gravity,” they simultaneously sing, “I hope it [their separate life paths] brings you bliss, / I really
hope you get it / And you don't live to regret it! / I hope you're happy in the end. / I hope you're
happy my friend” (Menzel and Chenoweth, “Defying Gravity”). Elphaba chooses to be a social
outcast in an attempt to help other outcasts; Glinda chooses to remain popular and socially
accepted because that’s been her desire throughout her life. These different paths brought them
to several conflicts, such as Fiyero and arguing over the ruby slippers, yet, in “For Good,” they
freely sing, “Because I knew you, / I have been changed for good,” utilizing the double entendre
of both for the better and for a lasting period, recognizing both how influential and how positive
the other’s presence has been in their lives (Menzel and Chenoweth, “For Good”). Elphaba asks
for forgiveness for her actions, to which Glinda responds, “But then, I guess we know / There's
blame to share,” both admitting, “none of it seems to matter anymore” (Menzel and Chenoweth,
“For Good”). They accept their failings to others and each other and forgive them, recognizing
their friendship is more important than those past moments. Furthermore, as Boyd musically
points out, usually the good female is sung as a soprano (Glinda) and the wicked/elder/jealous
female is an alto (Elphaba); however, in this song, Elphaba and Glinda vocally, “switch parts,
refuting our prior assumptions of which witch is good and which witch is wicked. By
momentarily trading places, their singing reveals not only the strength of their relationship, but
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their equality and interchangeability. Elphaba is not more ‘wicked’ than Glinda; Glinda is not
more ‘good’ than Elphaba” (Boyd, 113). By this point in the show, they’ve both done good and
bad deeds and are truly human and worthy of empathy. This isn’t just a verbal confirmation of
their friendship, but a vocal confirmation of how this friendship has altered them down to the
way they sing. Through this entire show, Elphaba and Glinda have grown together, because they
know each other. Elphaba gained an honest friend, who did not judge her by the color of her skin
or her magical abilities; Glinda realized that her superficial desires to be popular and perfect,
though gaining her power and prestige, are not more important than this friendship. So though
Elphaba doesn’t receive the society she desired, she at least built three individual, supportive,
and accepting relationships, which enabled her to invent her own identity outside of society and
retain her compassion and goodness. By the end of the show, Elphaba never truly acts the part of
the Wicked Witch, though she accepts the title, because of these supportive, constant, and
accepting relationships.
Here, then, is where Elphaba and Rousseau interact. Rousseau’s Discourse does have a
bit of optimism in his criticism of society; he argues that society corrupts most people… but not
all. Only those who retain “the law of nature” even while living within the confines of human
law – those who are most in tune to their inner Savage Man – are able to break “down the
imaginary barriers that separate different peoples…and include the whole human race in their
benevolence” (Rousseau, 30). These are rare beings, raised in society, yet are still compassionate
and benevolent – most likely to fight for the rights of the oppressed and to call out social
injustices. The ultimate difference between the Savage Man and the Social Man is this: “the
Savage Man lives within himself, while Social Man lives constantly outside himself, and only
knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his
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own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him” (Rousseau, 37). Those who
retain their inner Savage Man while existing within society can create identities that are selfsufficient, as opposed to the Social Man’s identity which is completely connected to their
reputation and standing within their community. This third category of human kind can be
described as the Savage-Social Man. Elphaba is the Savage-Social Man.
This is all well and good for understanding some of the meaning behind the experiences
of these two characters, but what of their larger social implications? After all, these stories aren’t
just about individuals. As stated above, everything Victor did was for the betterment of human
kind, whether in conjunction with his own ego or to protect the human race from his misguided
genius. Similarly, Wicked isn’t just about two friends; it’s about an entire society, and the social
and political misguidance that those in power can create and correct. To fully understand both
texts’ commentaries on the importance of empathy in relationships to ensure benevolence in
society, more interpretations of the implications of these texts need to be addressed.
To start, historically, Frankenstein has been seen as a warning on various issues, hence
its subtitle The Modern Prometheus.9 The allusion itself raises one warning: do not violate the
will of the gods (for this novel, Nature), even if it is for a higher purpose – i.e. helping mankind.
For the Romantics, however, this myth was viewed in a different light. Prometheus was an agent
of liberation, who was seen to “raise doubts about the established order of gods, questioning their
motives for creation, while giving justifications for rebellion against the reigning divine power,
indeed finding nobility in revolutionary figures” (Cantor, IX); hence, this trope to humanize the
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The myth of Prometheus, in short, is about a titan who steals fire from the Greek gods to aid
mankind and who is punished for this transgression against the gods by having his liver eaten by
an eagle for eternity (since he’s immortal and it’ll regrow).
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rebel within Romantic literature was described as “sympathy for the devil” (Cantor, IX).10 Thus,
Promethean characters can question the hierarchy of society and search for the root causes of
inequality and oppression. Mary Shelley, however, took this myth further. First, she critiques
Frankenstein’s own intentions for his creation, in that while hoping to achieve a great feat of
discovery for human nature, Victor is acting out of pride and a desire for fame; as Paul Cantor
describes: “Frankenstein’s activity as a creator presents such a mixture of idealistic and selfserving motives that evaluating it in moral terms becomes difficult. But whatever Frankenstein’s
intentions may be, he clearly does not plan his creation with the interests of his creature in mind”
(Cantor, 115). Victor acted not as a benevolent father figure but as a selfish and self-indulgent
creator, signaling that not all leaders act from true concern for other human beings. Second, she
complicates who is the rebel and who is the tyrant: “in Frankenstein… the issue of rebel vs.
tyrant is complicated by the discovery that in the process of revolution, the rebel threatens to turn
into a tyrant himself” (Cantor, X). Mary Shelley creates the Monster and Frankenstein as mirrors
of each other’s evolving natures – of their fears, hopes, and even frustrations – and this outward
projection of their faults onto each other only pushes their cycle of violence against one another
“for not living up to [their] expectations” of how the other should be (Cantor, 117). Victor
resents his creation for being a monstrosity and the Monster resents Victor for failing to care for
him as a son. They are each other’s tyrant and victim, in a never-ending struggle for power and
vengeance. It is exactly this the lack of empathy and the ability to identify with the other that
separates Victor and the Monster, pitting them against each other as enemies. From the familial
standpoint the Monster uses to make demands of Victor, this cycle of violence results in a
representation of negligent and/or abusive parent(s) harming their children, who retaliate with
10

The novel’s opening inscription and references to Milton’s Paradise Lost also heighten the
heroic view of rebelling against a tyrannical, all-powerful monarch.

Bezold 21
the same violence they feel the victim of, justifying their actions on the fact that their parent(s)
failed in their parental obligations.
Furthermore, many feminist readings of the novel take this critique one step further,
arguing that this story, and Victor and the Monster’s cyclical battle, is truly a cautionary tale of
keeping women out of the progression of society, silencing their contributions, and relegating
them to a domestic sphere in which they still have no power. The three named women in this
novel – Caroline Frankenstein, Elizabeth Frankenstein, and Justine Moritz – all die, after being
heralded as the epitome of femininity.11 They are silent and passive, receptors of the generosity
or ire of the males in power around them. Thus, this novel can also be a general critique of the
socially constructed gender binary, and the power dynamics it creates, between men,
representing reason and culture, and women, representing emotions/morality and nature
(Banerjee, 9). Shelley contest the separation of men and women from the domestic sphere by
highlighting “the importance of both the ‘culturiz(ing)’ role the family plays in assimilating a
child into the greater community and the humanizing impact on the individual of domestic
intercourse within the family” (Banerjee, 11). She can argue against “treating the familial realm
as a women’s ghetto” and for the fact “that men should commit themselves to the familial
equally with women” because of the ideal created in the story “of familial bonds as both the
basis of morality and the context of identity-formation” (Banerjee, 11, 12). Because of Victor’s
lack of concern for the creature he’d create and negligence in integrating the Monster into
society or protecting him from society, as is theoretically the duty a parent has to their child,
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Meaning, heralded as virtuous, beautiful, dutiful women who’s angelic nature is revered and
placed on a pedestal, while lacking agency, a voice, and the ability to make the men around them
heed their words. Victor often notes how being with Elizabeth brings him a semblance of peace
after creating the Monster, yet he never tells her about his creation, depriving her of any power to
help, because she is too good to be bothered with such messy matters.
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Shelley can point out the flaw of silencing women even in “their” own designated realm of
control. Whether or not one chooses to read this novel and argue that letting Elizabeth know of
the Monster’s creation may have saved several lives in that her clearly angelic disposition would
push her to empathize with the Monster and try to help him, the significance of parental empathy
towards their child for the peaceful security of both the child and society is at issue in this novel.
Victor failing in this parental duty, and failing to ask for help with them from anyone in any way,
shows the far-reaching negative impacts of denying the child one creates the empathy they duly
deserve. By combining the importance of men and women in the domestic sphere, emphasizing
the combined importance of their role as loving and benevolent guides for their children, thereby
contributing to the social integration and personal identification of their children, Shelley can
begin to break down several social norms by equalizing men and women in both spheres.
Other views of the morals and lessons from Frankenstein strictly focus on other general
social dichotomies. It’s been noted how Mary Shelley directly critiques Rousseauian philosophy
in the novel. She emphasizes that compassion leads beings, such as the Monster, to desire
society, which “marks a fluidity between the state of nature and that of culture, and undoes the
conceptual hiatus between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ that is the cornerstone of Rousseau’s
philosophy” (Banerjee, 14). However, she does agree with the Second Discourse in the belief
that “isolation from nature seems to be the permanent price man pays for his consciousness and
his creativity,” as neither author offers a solution to how humanity can return to a state of nature
or something similar (Cantor, 121).12 Furthermore, she also argues against the Enlightenment
belief that reason should be the true, moral guide of all actions “by insisting on the importance of
12

This is further evidenced in the novel when Victor takes time to appreciate nature as a way to
rejuvenate his soul. These parts of the novel are hiatuses from the plot – at no point does an
important event or conversation take place while Victor feels at one or is appreciating nature. He
must leave these moments for the plot to continue.
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real-world/cultural contingencies” such as the ethical implications of reason’s dictates (Banerjee,
7). Again, Victor’s failure to consider the personal consequences to the Monster and human
society in his creation of the Monster is an example of the dangers of reason, which would
dictate solving the scientific puzzle of creating life for the betterment of human kind and
scientific progress, when given free reign without considering the implications and effects of
these actions on others. If Victor had taken time to consider how his Monster would be received
by the populace, and how he would react to that populace, Victor may have realized it is better to
make life the natural way, which would have spared the lives of: Elizabeth, Justine, his brother
William, and Henry Clerval, his best friend. Again, having empathy for another creature,
whether living or hypothetical, and considering the consequences of one’s actions on others
would have created a better outcome for society as a whole. Lastly, in a commentary on
Romanticism itself, on “the idealistic refusal to accept the facts of human nature,” Victor and the
Monster “are symbols of the Romantic revolt against the human condition,” a tragic story that
dramatizes “the tragedy of Romanticism itself” (Cantor, 132). For Mary Shelley, the dangers of
letting idealism blind one to reality lies in the damage it does to those around the Promethean
rebel, as the novel only too well portrays.
I will offer one more interpretation as a bridge between the two green-skinned rebels of
this essay. The issues of colonization arise in several ways in this novel, from the idealistic
Henry Clerval discussing traveling to India for adventure and economic gain, to the Monster
promising Victor to travel to the least humanly populated region he could think of – South
America – to the fact that this novel was written in the 1800s, a period of transitioning from
colonization to imperialization. Thus, it isn’t difficult to read the Monster as more than just a
child with poor parenting or a representation of harmful effects of keeping women out of society;
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the Monster is also a symbol to represent “the position of an alien being in an uncomprehending
community,” whether colonized immigrant or colonized at the colony (Cantor, 129). His
repeated social rejection, based on his appearance, and the corruption this causes can be likened
to the treatment and reactions of the colonized or other types of social minorities. Elphaba, for
similar reasons, also represents the victims of social oppression and those who fight that
oppression.
Truthfully, Elphaba isn’t the only one in the musical who fulfills this role, though she is
the most accessible. Since her struggle isn’t just a social cause, but a personal struggle to find
identity and belonging, it’s no surprise that “‘Wicked ’s producers… emphatically stress its
universality, asserting that Elphaba’s ‘difference’ stands in for all difference’” (MacDonald,
200). She can stand for women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, immigrants, etc. Furthermore, in
getting to care for Elphaba, the audience not only identifies with her but learns to identify with
the “kinds of people that we would not ordinarily encounter” outside the theatre, preparing them
to be empathetic and respectful during those encounters (MacDonald, 203). In fact, a very easy
parallel to make is between Elphaba and immigrants to a new society, like the Monster, since
“Immigrants moving to America as well as Americans migrating to urban centres often
experience similar feelings and expectations of (job) opportunities, skill development and a sense
of belonging” (MacDonald, 204-205). This desire to find a new home in a new location comes
with its own perils, and Elphaba’s struggles for acceptance throughout her journeys in Oz depict
the “failed promise of success, and the associated costs inspired by the promised land”
(MacDonald, 205-206). For an individual, Elphaba represents a way to navigate these trials
without losing one’s identity, beliefs, or values. She presents an example of how to deal with this
type of suffering by retaining empathy, by refusing to become spiteful or malevolent.
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To take a step further than in Frankenstein, Wicked’s Animals are also direct
representatives of marginalized peoples, as the show is a call to establish empathy to
marginalized groups in order to fight for their rights. Their plight in both the Wicked novel and
musical portrays a land “where the mistrust of anyone different alienates and victimizes many
innocent people,” which was the intent of playwright Stephen Schwartz. This is the way one Dr.
Dillamond, William Youmans, described his interpretation of the social significance and
symbolism of his role: “It’s pretty clear that Dr. Dillamond represents the Jews in World War II:
You know, being forced from his profession first, and then gradually marginalized, and then
finally imprisoned and abused” (Cote, 49). However, it isn’t hard to take this comparison one
step further, “given the prejudice still faced by many minority groups, particularly in the heated
aftermath of 9/11, Wicked can be read as an allegory for more recent, even current political
events” (Boyd, 98). The Animals can represent, in our time, Jews, African Americans, Muslims,
Immigrants and Refugees, and the LGBTQ+ Community (to name a few). At its core, the plight
of the Animals is a discussion in power – the power to tell a story and declare it fact. It is a
representation on hegemony, or “the ability of the dominant or institutional group to persuade or
coerce a subordinate group to accept its own oppression because there is significant benefit for
the subordinate group by doing so” (Schrader and Schuylkill). For the Animals, that is accepting
the loss of their rights, their occupations, their status as citizens, and their eventual de-evolution,
to ensure their own lives. Dr. Dillamond even emphasizes this point in his history class by
explaining the major events in Ozian history that has led up to the growing persecution of the
Animals. The point of this comparison serves “as a reminder for audience members that there
have been many social groups throughout history that have been unfairly blamed and persecuted
for a nation’s problems” (Schrader and Schuylkill). Moreover, it further reminds the audience
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that, like Elphaba, all it takes is empathizing with one individual, even if it is just being able to
identify with their plight, which can serve to establish the altruistic desire to fight for their rights.
Her relationship with Dr. Dillamond guides her motives and actions for the rest of the musical.
Taking this relationship a step further, Elphaba’s involvement in the plight of the Animals, as an
ally, also points out the perils that allies subject themselves too in order to help minority groups:
The Lion’s story13 suggests that Elphaba has become a scapegoat for her own
cause. Animals whom she has tried to help have blamed her for their troubles.
Some social protest leaders, like Elphaba, have become a scapegoat for their own
causes. One figure in U.S. history that exemplifies this is abolitionist John Brown.
Brown became a leader of antislavery guerillas and fought against proslavery
attacks. In retribution for a proslavery attack, Brown brutally murdered five
settlers in a proslavery town (“John Brown”). While some abolitionists, like
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, praised Brown (“John
Brown”), other leaders, like Abraham Lincoln, disapproved of Brown’s actions
and believed he was insane (Sandburg). Brown became one of the most
controversial figures of his time and has been partially credited with starting the
Civil War (Frye). Like Brown, Elphaba is not only a scapegoat for her opposition,
but for those who support her cause. Elphaba reminds audience members that one
of the risks of fighting against hegemony is becoming a scapegoat. (Schrader and
Schuylkill)
But instead of using this message to deter audience members from social justice activism,
Elphaba inspires the audience to take that risk, knowing that regardless of the outcomes they are
acting for good. This, the musical argues, is what truly matters and what will help society.
The best way, though, both stories emphasize the overarching singular message that
empathy is the cure to society’s multifaceted corruptive nature is through their use of layered
narrative structure. Frankenstein begins with sailor/adventurer Walton’s one-sided
correspondence to his sister, Margaret, telling her the tale of the Monster via conversations with
Victor. This frame is complicated both by Victor’s story and by Victor telling Walton the
13

While at Shiz someone brought in a lion cub in a cage to show the class where an animal’s
“rightful” place is. Elphaba steals the cage, and with Fiyero, frees the lion cub. In the song “The
March of the Witch Hunters,” Boq explains that the Cowardly Lion is that lion cub, and because
Elphaba freed him, instead of letting him “fight his own battles,” she made him a coward.
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Monster’s story, all of which is recorded by Walton in these letters. Though Walton berates the
Monster at the end of the novel, he leaves judgment of both the Monster and Victor up to his
sister, and by relation the reader. The multiple narrative structure of the novel strips the Monster
of the ability to defend himself as his motives and actions are retold and, presumably, altered by
the two other men who tell it. This doesn’t mean the entire novel should be chucked as biased
lies; the narrative structure engages the reader to question the biases of all three narrators while
being able to generally accept the events and messages of the story as true. This novel plays with
the use of empathy not just to identify with all the characters,14 thereby recognizing that the
reader themselves could become any of these characters, but also with the less vocalized use of
empathy as a means to question the narratives being espoused to seek the truth behind the biases.
Walton’s lack of judgment for the Monster depicts both uses of empathy, balancing what Victor
has claimed the Monster has done with the final parting words of the Monster, which mostly
sound regretful. Thus, Walton teaches the reader to utilize and learn from both forms of empathy,
self-identification and skepticism. He turns his ship home; he spreads this story as a way to teach
others these lessons; he is the character the reader is meant to identify with at the end of the
novel, for he is the one the reader should be inspired to become – someone who can learn from
other’s mistakes via empathizing with them and actively decide to improve the social situation
around them from that knowledge.
Similarly in structure, Wicked is framed within Glinda’s memories, as she retells
Elphaba’s story. This highlights how, like the Monster, Elphaba “loses agency in her own story”
(Boyd, 114). Glinda must be the one to tell Elphaba’s story, to give it any credence or
plausibility, because she is initially, innately taken for granted as being “Glinda the Good” and
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Yes, that includes Victor.
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ends the show as the only character in a position and with a desire to do good. However, as the
ending lines of the show reveal, though Glinda may have the knowledge of Elphaba’s goodness,
she cannot share that truth. As the Munchkins’ repetition of “Wicked” drown out the “good” in
Elphaba and Glinda’s last “I have been changed for good,” the reality of Elphaba’s place in
Ozian history is cemented (Cast, “Finale”); Elphaba will forever be the Wicked Witch, though
she never acted with wickedness. Glinda cannot free Elphaba of this title and must accept it in
order to keep the favor of the citizens of Oz and begin to undo the social damage the Wizard has
caused. Like with Frankenstein, Wicked’s characters are fleshed out enough for the audience to
recognize how easy it is to become any of these characters; and like Frankenstein, it is the
narrator, at the end of the story, that the audience not only empathizes but should identify with.
Glinda, with the knowledge of the experience of persecution suffered by both the Animals and
Elphaba because of the Wizard, can take that knowledge and put it to social use – she can begin
the slow process of reversing the marginalization of the Animals. She may not be able to rewrite
history, but that doesn’t mean later generations are as limited. She just has to start Oz on the path
to allow that revision in the future. Her empathy for, and her self-identification and friendship
with, Elphaba matures Glinda, empowering her with a better moral grounding and a desire to
take up Elphaba’s activism and succeed where Elphaba could not. The audience can likewise
take this story about empathy and follow in Glinda’s bubble, creating positive social change even
with what limited power they possess.
That’s not to say, however, that Glinda’s story should be accepted without skepticism.
After all, Elphaba is her best friend and the Wizard did cause her death. This would undoubtedly
shape how Glinda remembers the past and how she would share it. Even in this benign case,
though the story is being told from a character feeling empathy for the character they are
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discussing, it is important to utilize empathy’s healthy criticism to recognize the biases of this
narration, recognizing that Glinda may distort what she is remembering, in a kind of reverse
Walton – out of love for Elphaba and hatred or dislike of the Wizard. As with Frankenstein, this
does not mean the entire show should be chucked as elegiac nonsense; the general events and
messages of this show can be accepted while the audience members question the authenticity of
the characterizations therein. Again, it is a quest for truth that this tale of empathy highlights,
accepting that this quest will circularly question the story itself. It is up to each audience member
to decide what the truth is from his or her own analysis of the tale.
The Wizard himself focuses on the issues of storytelling and power in his song
“Wonderful.” Before that analysis, however, it is important to highlight a bit more about the
Wizard and his relationship with Elphaba, since he parallels Victor with the Monster in several
ways. Throughout the First Act Elphaba speaks of the Wizard with reverence and awe, as most
Ozians do.15 When she finally meets him, he sings to her “A Sentimental Man,” relating how his
desire to be a father underpins his political decisions. As lyricist Stephen Schwartz explains
No matter how intentionally manipulating and falsely emotional the music in “A
Sentimental Man,” on some level the Wizard does mean it. He really wanted to be
a father. He is honestly sentimental, even though he’s a villain. And, at the end of
Wicked, when he realizes that he destroyed his own daughter – it’s so devastating
to him, he’s willing to pack it in and leave Oz. (Cote, 80)
When Elphaba realizes that he is the cause of the harm to the Animals she challenges him about
his parenting style by claiming that the Wizard “lied to [the citizens of Oz]” (Menzel,
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During the Wiz-O-Mania part of “One Short Day,” the citizens of the Emerald City – the city
the Wizard told them to build as a capital – sing: “Who’s the mage/ Whose major itinerary/ Is
making all Oz merrier?/ Who’s the sage/ Who sagely sailed in to save/ Our posteriers?/ Whose
enthuse for hot air ballooning/ Has all of Oz honeymooning?/ Woo oo oo/ Wiz-n’t he
Wonderful?/ Our Wonderful Wizard!” This verse not only serves to set the Wizard as a wise and
benevolent ruler, but as a husband-figure to the nation of Oz, and adds to his later claim to be a
father to Oz’s citizens.
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“Wonderful”). Understanding that this encounter could be a way to regain her trust, the Wizard
begins “intellectually seducing Elphaba, who is exhausted and isolated” to join his side (Cote,
85). The originator of the role, Joel Grey, described the Wizard’s motives this song: “I had this
idea that the Wizard loved Elphaba so much, but never realized that she’s his daughter. His
connection with her was very important. In that scene, she’s so dark and angry and thinks the
Wizard is such a bad guy, I just had to charm her somehow. So I get her to dance with me. And
dance with joy” (Cote, 44-45). In a campy and carefree tune the Wizard blatantly explains the
malleability of history, starting by stating, “Where I come from, we believe all sorts of things
that aren't true. We call it History” (Grey, “Wonderful”). He continues, singing, “A man's called
a traitor / Or liberator. / A rich man's a thief / Or philanthropist. / Is one a crusader / Or ruthless
invader? / It's all in which label / Is able to persist,” reminding her that public opinion trumps
truth, merit, and motive (Grey, “Wonderful”).16 He promises her that “the most celebrated/ are
the rehabilitated,” reassuring her that if she joins him she could still be accepted by society as she
dreamed, because he’d deem it (Grey, “Wonderful”). So although Wicked “serves as a warning
to audience members about the dangers of apathy and the necessity of taking action,” to help the
persecuted, it also poignantly elaborates on the dubious nature of all history, any story, and basic
common knowledge as not a product of truth but of popular consent and belief (Schrader and
Schuylkill). For the Wizard, social truth is not about empathy, but about what is easiest and more
palatable for the public to accept; usually, this denies both empathy and humanity to the
outsiders – like Elphaba and the Animals – by blaming them for any and every social ill. This
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This is a continuation of the same sentiment from Glinda’s Act One song, “Popular.” As
Schwartz describes: “it’s also political. Glinda refers to the fact that politicians and heads of state
get by not because they’re particularly smart, but because people would like to hang out with
them” (Cote, 79). Both emphasize the importance of social acceptance, over merit,
trustworthiness, or experience, for rising to power, cementing that power, and ensuring fame.
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refers back to the issue of the rebel vs. the tyrant that Victor and the Monster face, in that the
publicly accepted view of history scapegoats individuals to be dethroned instead of dismantling
or revamping the flawed social institutions that allow for inequalities and oppression. The
Wizard understands the power of public opinion and forgoes empathizing with a group of his
citizen-children to turn public opinion into the means for cementing his control over Oz. The
Wizard’s tale ends as Glinda helps him realize that Elphaba is his child, and as noted above, he
leaves Oz as punishment both for his power and child abuse. Unlike Victor, the Wizard does
regret his actions, but only upon accepting his responsibility as Elphaba’s father; he would not
have regretted his actions had she merely remained one of his child-citizens.
In repeatedly comparing his political rule to that of a parent, the Wizard brings up one
main message to take from Wicked, Frankenstein, and the Second Discourse, one that underpins
them all. As stated earlier, Rousseau argues that the bedrock for all inequalities begins with the
creation of family units, which aggregates the further into larger societies one goes. Detailing
how the individual actions of the characters affect the larger social network of their stories, both
Frankenstein and Wicked agree with Rousseau by showing how the family could be the basis for
poor morality, social adjustment, and identity creation. However, they also argue against him;
these stories of empathy between individuals, or lack thereof, beginning from the home and
expanding into society, argue that the moral grounding that should come from the empathy of
family members should and can be replicated, if not present, by supportive friendships, ensuring
individuals retain their inner altruism and benevolence, instead of becoming the corrupt monsters
society has the propensity to create.
These are stories that take the metaphor that “the state is like a family” and question the
assumptions that this is a good thing by point out how horrible families can be. This is why the
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interpretations of the Monster and Elphaba as representations of oppressed groups, from women
to minorities to the colonized, works. By the logic of this metaphor, Victor, Elphaba’s nonbiological father, and the Wizard represent the political leaders, or at least the groups in power.
Victor rises to power – the power to create and decide the fate of a life – through animating the
Monster; Elphaba’s non-biological father is the governor of Munchkinland (a position that is
apparently inheritable since Nessarose assumes the role after her father dies); the Wizard, as he
describes in “Wonderful,” is “a mediocrity thrust into prominence,” or an accidental total despot
(Cote, 85). Victor, after achieving his power, is constantly in fear of what the consequences of
this newfound power will bring, and more importantly in fear of losing control of that power in
losing control of the Monster. It’s not hard to conceive of a few European folk looking at the
economic and political empire they created, built on the backs of the harshly subjected colonized
(and later imperialized) people, who feared the chaos and the violence that would inevitably
come about when those they oppressed decided they deserved better treatment. Moreover, the
Monster, arguing for Victor to fulfill his societal role and help the Monster find a society he can
be happy in, doesn’t just have to represent the colonized. The Monster can represent women or
other marginalized members of society, such as the poor. He claims the empathy demanded by
the subjects of the party in power, and represents the negative consequences of denying that
empathy. He represents the danger of a rebel fighting a person instead of the system, losing his
own empathy and the ability to see that what is truly to blame for his oppression is not
necessarily just one individual but an entire social system at work.
The Wizard, more so than Elphaba’s non-biological father, is an easier and better
representation of this metaphor. Again, in the song “A Sentimental Man” and in “Wonderful,”
the Wizard emphasizes to Elphaba that he really wants a family, but because he doesn’t have
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one, he rules Oz as if they were his children. This is a mentality that inherently paints any leader
as benevolent and moral, as it is logically expected that they will use the same care and guidance
for the nation as they would for their own child. Regardless of how honest this repeated
sentiment is, the Wizard also depicts the dark side of ruling and parenthood – some children are
not treated with the same love as the others. This is evidenced not just in his negative treatment
of Elphaba and positive treatment of Glinda, depending on which one obeys him, but also in his
treatment of the Animals. Like the less favorite, rebellious, or even illegitimate child, the
Animals are neglected and abused as sub-citizen creatures, forced into positions of servitude and
silence. The oppression of one group of people by sowing fear into the hearts of everyone else is
how another group can stay in power, and David Garrison, one Wizard, realizes this is exactly
how the Wizard intends to run Oz: “The only way to hold onto power is to convince people that
they ought to be afraid of something. But of course like all good villains, he doesn’t think of
himself as the villain. Everybody in the show, to a certain extent, is swimming in those morally
dangerous waters, but it’s Elphaba who makes the ethical choice” (Cote, 45). Where the Wizard
deprives empathy to the Animals, and teaches all of Oz to follow suit, Elphaba rejects this
message and sows empathy for the Animals.
This is why the song “Wonderful” is the most socially and politically charged song in the
show. It elaborates not just on the problematic implications of substituting the state for the
family, and vice versa, but on the unquestioned assumption that what leaders and history tells us
is right. “Wonderful” clearly defines one core problem of the show – the difference between
reality and perception – because “The Wizard talks about how the truth is a lie agreed upon by
society” (Cote, 85). Yes, the Wizard is trying to coax Elphaba to his side once again, using
acceptance like baiting a child with candy, by telling her it’s the powerful who dictate what the
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masses think, if they can put it into clear-cut and morally unambiguous images; images that are
so convenient and satisfying no one would want to question them. He, as the center of power and
having created an image of himself as an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient leader,
can change the way Elphaba is remembered because he has the masses’ support and acceptance.
All she has to do is give up who she is, her morals, and her voice. The audience empathizes with
Elphaba because of this difficult decision, and in seeing her make the right choice – not just
socially, to continue fighting the Wizard, but personally, to stay true to herself – the audience
sees that her choice is more of a victory than the actual success of her endeavors is. She inspires
the audience to do and accept the same in their own lives, valuing truth and morality over power
and acceptance. In this way, though both stories share the same messages – that the family,
society, and the political regime can be corrupt, that empathy both guides individuals to moral
amelioration and to the truth, and that regardless of the source the stories told need to be
examined for biases and inaccuracies – the embodiments of these messages are opposites. The
Monster is someone to learn how not to be. Elphaba is someone to emulate.
Thus, the Monster, as the representative of the corruption of Society and being a Social
Man, is a warning; Elphaba, as the Savage-Social Man able to recognize when society is wrong
and desiring to fix its problems, is a role model. The former shows the reader how not to give
into ignorance, hate, and revenge by detailing the consequences of that path, both on the familial
and social levels; the latter shows the audience that even though the personal and social costs of
morality and benevolence are high, ultimately they are more rewarding as both the individual
and those around them learn to be better people and own up to their mistakes, slowly amending
society for good. Both narratives center on the use, or lack thereof, of empathy as a way to
bridge the gap between different people, expanding this empathy to the wider socio-political
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realm. At the heart of the family and political metaphors in all three texts is a call to recognize
those typically “othered” as not separated from but connected to oneself. Doing so, the hopeful
underlying message of these texts claims, will prevent the disastrous effects of parental neglect,
fear-mongering, power-abuse, and social oppression.
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